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A research enclave in 1940s Nigeria : the Rockefeller Foundation Yellow 
Fever Research Institute at Yaba, Lagos, 1943-49 
 
 
Over the last 30 years of so, sub-Saharan Africa has been the site of extensive 
biomedical research and interventions by ‘global health’ institutions. Though 
there are multiple definitions of ‘global health’, in general this term refers to a 
combination of initiatives launched in the post-World War 11 period (but 
particularly since the 1980s) by actors based outside of the continent, including 
large philanthropic foundations, international health organisations, bilateral 
agencies and public-private partnerships. Alongside these initiatives there has 
now emerged a considerable literature in medical and social anthropology, 
science and technology studies and history analysing the impact of these 
initiatives.1 Whilst acknowledging the very real advances in health outcomes that 
recent global health investments have made, much of this work is highly critical 
of the modes of operation of global health institutions – their relative lack of 
accountability, their technocratic and experimental foci, their biosecurity 
agendas and (in some accounts) implication in the construction of forms of 
‘biopower’. Many scholars see ‘global health’ as operating in a kind of ‘state of 
exception’, exercising a form of semi-privatised governmentality that lies outside 
the control of African states and their citizens, creating ‘parastates’ and islands of 
medical research and surveillance in the context of growing health inequalities 
and crumbling public health systems. 2 
 
There is some disagreement in this literature on the question of continuity or 
discontinuity between the workings of ‘global health’ and the institutions of 
colonial and international health that preceded it. As some philanthropic 
foundations increasingly operate with larger budgets than that of the World 
Health Organisation, it can be argued that we are in a new era of privatised 
global health, producing “new biopolitical forms” in Africa and a “new vital 
politics”.3 Others point to greater continuity in international health interventions 
in Africa in the post World War 11 period, or beyond into the late colonial and 
inter-war periods.4 .5 The current power and influence of global health 
foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, also has roots that 
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go much deeper than that of the late twentieth century, as a number of authors 
have pointed out.6 There is a tension in this recent literature between a critique 
of global health practices as remote, technocratic and experimental, and a 
parallel critique of its interventions as excessively intrusive, especially in the 
area of sexual health, and engaged in the construction of new forms of 
citizenship and subjectivity. Guillaume Lachenal describes the work of the 
scientific community of ‘virus hunters’ in Africa as a form of ‘medical nihilism’ 
characterised by a mixture of scientific hubris and non-intervention (or the 
‘intervention of non-intervention’) in the context of failing public health 
systems.7 The unfolding of the 2015 West African Ebola epidemic came as a 
reminder of how s phisticated international medical research on viruses in 
Africa coexists with catastrophically under-resourced public health facilities.  
 
In the light of this literature on global health in Africa, this paper examines the 
history of the Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba, near Lagos in Nigeria in 
the 1940s. It is largely based on the documentation produced by the Rockefeller-
funded personnel, supplemented by British Colonial Office papers, and is 
inevitably limited by that. No doubt there is a much fuller story to be told by 
historians of science in Nigeria.8 Though largely funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the YFRI at Yaba was nevertheless formed by a collaboration with 
the British colonial authorities, employing British as well as American scientists. 
I argue that the YFRI demonstrated many of the characteristics of the 
international research enclave as described by scholars of present-day global 
health in Africa. Like them, I also argue that the laboratory that formed the heart 
of this enclave was far from being hermetically sealed – it formed part of a larger 
experimental field in which technologies were tried out and tested. I am not 
arguing that the YFRI was in any way typical of scientific or medical research in 
Africa at the time, but it is a striking precursor to recent examples. Though the 
scientists of the YFRI were central to a wartime programme of vaccine 
development and supply to Allied troops, for the most part they regarded West 
Africa as a site for pure research into viruses and were largely disengaged from 
the pressing needs of public health, which they regarded as the responsibility of 
the colonial authorities. Scientifically ambitious, sophisticated and very well 
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funded, the YFRI scientists embarked on a programme of research that took 
them from laboratory to the ‘field’ and thus, inevitably, into a highly unequal 
engagement with Nigerian (and other West African) communities.   
 
By and large this story does not resonate with that told by Helen Tilley of late 
colonial scientists engaging self-critically with African realities.9 It is in part a 
story of post-war scientific optimism and of ambition, but the ambition related 
more to ‘pure’ research than it did to public health applications. The Rockefeller 
scientists were optimistic that their research in Africa would result in a 
significant advance in knowledge of the yellow fever virus, particularly in its 
endemic form, and to some extent this ambition was fulfilled. Their work in 
Africa was at the cutting edge of virology and they could claim to have 
discovered much about virus behaviour that is still relevant today, as recent 
discussions of the Zika virus have shown.10 This knowledge had the potential to 
inform attempts to control the spread of viral disease globally.11 During and after 
World War 11 this may have been given added urgency by biosecurity concerns, 
particularly over the use of viral agents as biological weapons. Rarely did they 
attempt to justify their investment in terms of African public health. Indeed, as 
Heather Bell argued in her pioneering work on yellow fever in eastern Africa, it 
would have been difficult for them to do so since yellow fever did not appear to 
be the most pressing of medical issues for the colonial authorities in Africa, 
though they may well have underestimated its impact.12 Critically, though an 
effective and largely safe vaccine had been available since 1937, the British 
colonial authorities (unlike the French) did not attempt any major vaccination 
campaign in West Africa in this period, except when an epidemic occurred, 
viewing this as impractical and expensive.13 The Rockefeller scientists may have 
been privately critical of this inertia, but by this time the International Health 
Division of the Rockefeller Foundation had largely withdrawn from public health, 
making the story of their African involvement very different from those in 
Central and South America.14 Whilst they urged the British to increase their 
investment in medical research in West Africa, and occasionally warned of the 
danger of a resurgence of yellow fever epidemics, they did not actively advocate 
for the health of African colonial subjects.  
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West Africa in the history of yellow fever research 
The history of yellow fever in the Americas in the late nineteenth and early  
twentieth centuries is, with good reason, a mainstay of history of medicine 
textbooks. Epidemics of this incurable vector-borne viral disease, probably 
originating in Africa and assumed to have been carried to the New World in slave 
trading ships, periodically devastated non-immune populations in the Americas 
until the early twentieth century. Yellow fever was a major danger to trade and 
settlement in the Americas (and, to a lesser extent, Europe) in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; it was implicated in the Haitian revolution and threatened 
to destabilise projects of imperialism in Central and South America. The 
discovery of the mosquito vector responsible for urban yellow fever epidemics 
(aedes aegypti) and the implementation of highly effective environmental and 
sanitation measures form part of a narrative of disease ‘conquest’ in which 
American science and scientists typically play heroic roles.15 The late nineteenth 
century advances in the control of yellow fever were, without a doubt, 
impressive, notwithstanding the fact that the commonly told account neglected 
to relate the whole story and, in particular, sidelined the input of non-American 
actors. 16  
 
As vector control proved effective and urban epidemics receded in the Americas, 
so yellow fever appeared to be a less immediate threat there, and total 
eradication seemed plausible through control of the insect vector responsible for 
those epidemics, aedes aegypti. But the early twentieth century was also a time of  
increasing colonisation of many parts of the world by imperial powers and 
agents of international capitalism. With the development of faster transport links 
(notably air travel) the possibility that endemic yellow fever might ‘jump’ from 
one continent to another, causing devastating epidemics, especially in Asia, was 
the source of increasing anxiety on the part of European imperial powers and the 
United States after the First World War.17  It was at this point that the 
Rockefeller Foundation began its major investment in yellow fever research and 
control. The coastal regions of West Africa had suffered from large-scale urban 
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epidemics of yellow fever in the late nineteenth century and the early years of 
the twentieth century, Europeans appeared particularly vulnerable and 
mortality rates amongst colonisers were disconcertingly high.18  From 1916-
1949 expenditure on research on yellow fever in Africa carried out by the 
International Health Division of the Foundation amounted to around one and a 
quarter million dollars, but this was only a fraction of a global expenditure of 
nearly $14m.19 Much of this investment was made in Central and South 
America.20 Nevertheless, the Foundation’s West African yellow fever research in 
the 1920s and 1930s was highly significant scientifically and achieved 
considerable fame.  
 
From 1925 until 1934, the Foundation, in collaboration with the British colonial 
authorities funded the West Africa Yellow Fever Commission with a laboratory 
in Yaba, near Lagos.21 As Marisa Chambers has argued, though the Foundation 
initially announced an interest in control work similar to that carried out in 
Central and South America, this failed to materialise and it soon became clear 
that West Africa would be the site of research, not public health intervention.22 
This was in line with a more general shift away from public health to research 
within the International Health Division of the Foundation, as described by 
Farley.23 But is also reflects the largely impoverished colonial context of West 
Africa and prevailing attitudes towards Africans.24 
 
As a scientific body, the Commission achieved fame, for both good and bad 
reasons. In 1927 its scientists had made a major advance when they identified a 
susceptible animal that could be used for experimentation – the rhesus monkey. 
From this point they developed the crucially important ‘protection test’, a 
method which allowed them to identify individuals who had been exposed to 
yellow fever in the past and had developed immunity. The test involved injecting 
a person’s serum along with the live virus into a rhesus monkey. If the monkey 
survived, this demonstrated the ‘protective’ qualities of the human serum; if it 
died, then it was assumed that the serum conveyed no immunity.25  By 1931 it 
had been shown by Max Theiler that this method could be used on mice, and that 
the virus could then be passed directly from mouse to mouse using intracerebral 
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injections. This discovery greatly expanded the applicability of the protection 
test but also opened up numerous other experimental avenues. Ultimately it 
enabled Theiler to produce a vaccine made possible by a Ghanaian named ‘Asibi” 
whose blood had been taken by a member of the Commission, Alexander 
Mahaffy.26 But the research had also taken its toll on the community of yellow 
fever scientists. The Commission’s laboratories had been shown to be 
mismanaged.  A total of six scientists died as a result of accidental infections, and 
though this was glossed in terms of heroic sacrifice, it was also a story of hubris, 
especially on the part of one its more famous members, Hideyo Noguchi, who 
stubbornly adhered to his mistaken theory of a bacterial agent beyond the point 
at which this appeared plausible. 27 
 
The Commission withdrew in 1934.  The discovery of endemic, or  ‘jungle’ yellow 
fever in Brazil in 1932 had radically changed the picture of yellow fever 
epidemiology. The prospect of total eradication receded with the recognition 
that there might be large areas of the tropics and sub-tropics where yellow fever 
was endemic, amongst human populations, other mammalian populations, or 
both, and that more than one insect vector might be implicated. As Nancy Stepan 
argues, by the mid-1930s the Rockefeller scientists had abandoned the dream of 
yellow fever eradication, which ten years earlier had seemed to be within reach. 
Total eradication was impossible without destroying the forest habitats and 
animals which acted as reservoirs of the endemic variety of the disease. On the 
other hand the possibility of species eradication of the urban vector, aedes 
aegypti, combined with the use of a new and safer vaccine from 1937 implied 
that the disease might be effectively controlled and major epidemics averted.28 
Scientific interest in ‘jungle’ or ‘sylvatic’ yellow fever, its animal reservoirs and 
vectors, led the Foundation back to Africa, but this time to Uganda where, in 
1936, it opened (collaboratively with the British colonial authorities) a Yellow 
Fever Research Institute at Entebbe and pursued both laboratory and field-based 
research in forest areas. 29  
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 In 1943, spurred on in part by the perceived danger of the resurgence of 
epidemic yellow fever in West Africa as a result of the movement of non-immune 
Allied personnel, the Rockefeller scientists were back at Yaba in Lagos 
establishing an ambitious research programme collaboratively with the colonial 
government which lasted until late 1948 and continued in a reduced form 
beyond that. 30 This was a wartime initiative, framed by the global conflict. The 
Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba had three stated aims. Firstly, it would 
conduct research into yellow fever in West Africa “in order to determine 
whether the jungle version of the disease discovered several years ago in South 
America has a counterpart in West Africa”. Secondly, its laboratory would serve 
as a distribution centre for yellow fever vaccine to troops and “settlements”(for 
which read, non-African settlements) in West Africa. Thirdly, it would “provide 
British government units with a consultative service on problems of yellow fever 
control.”31 Links between the Yaba and Entebbe laboratories were strong, with 
personnel and material moving constantly between the two and beyond to the 
central laboratory in New York and to fellow Rockefeller scientists in Central and 
South America. There was also an uneasy collaboration with the French, whose 
Pasteur Institute at Dakar developed its own highly ambitious and sometimes 
controversial programme in French African territories.32  
 
 
Porous laboratories: the YFRI at Yaba as a colonial scientific enclave   
The YFRI at Yaba resembled a classic colonial scientific enclave, but it had some 
peculiar characteristics. Firstly, it was much more generously funded than most 
equivalent British colonial institutions, and secondly it was an American-run 
institution within a British colonial setting. Like many enclaves of today’s global 
medical research, it was an island of technological ambition, set within a wider 
context of medical deprivation.33 However, the use of sophisticated equipment 
coexisted with the most basic of techniques, and did not free the scientists from a 
heavy dependence on the labour of their Nigerian employees.  By the late 1940s 
the compound included a new animal house and laboratory, the latter home to a 
hoard of expensive imported equipment. The housing for its senior scientists 
was elaborate; there was a tennis court, carefully tended rose gardens and plenty 
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of motor vehicles.34 Not all American ‘wives’ flourished at Yaba, and war-time 
travel restrictions made the journey to and from the United States unpredictable, 
so this was a predominantly male environment, as Bugher’s more private 
correspondence with his colleagues reveals.35  Despite their enclave-like 
qualities, African spaces of scientific research were and are not pristine 
experimental spaces. Yaba was no exception. On the one hand, the documentary 
record emphasises its apparent isolation from the everyday realities of late-
colonial Lagos. On the other hand, it was clearly a very porous space, dependent 
on a constant supply of imported materials, the labour of a large staff of Nigerian 
personnel and the provision of blood and other biological material from its 
surrounding communities and environment. The transgression of the laboratory 
space was constantly in evidence. As Robert Kohler has argued, the 
“placenessness” of the  laboratory was always a cultural convention.36 
 
Given the unfortunate earlier history of errors, accidental infections and deaths, 
when the Rockefeller scientists returned to Yaba in 1943 it must have seemed 
incumbent on them to demonstrate that they could run a laboratory in Africa 
safely and responsibly. This task fell largely on the man who in 1943 was 
appointed Director of the Yellow Fever Research Institute at Yaba, Dr John 
Bugher.37  Bugher, born in Indiana in 1901, had taught bacteriology and 
pathology at the University of Michigan before joining the Foundation’s field staff 
in 1937. He had worked extensively on ‘jungle’ yellow fever in Colombia before 
transferring to Lagos.38 Arriving in Nigeria, Bugher was introduced to key British 
colonial officials by the director of the Entebbe institute, Alexander Mahaffy.39 He 
then embarked on a fact-finding tour of West Africa, publicising the Rockefeller’s 
yellow fever programme.  
 
One of Bugher’s first tasks was to set up an efficient mouse colony, vital to the 
work of the laboratory that he was re-establishing. When the Commission 
scientists had packed their bags in 1934, they had left behind them the vestiges 
of a mouse colony, which had been haphazardly maintained by colonial 
personnel.  The mice now exhibited an unacceptably high degree of variability in 
terms of their susceptibility. Housing and feeding the mice adequately was vital 
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to their use as experimental and breeding animals, and preoccupied Bugher in 
the first couple of years. The mice also required imported wheat germ and oats 
for their diet. Refrigeration was required for the mouse supplies and ceiling fans 
were needed for the mice themselves. Caring for the mice was largely the task of 
Nigerian employees. These men (and, briefly it seems, one woman) were listed in 
the YFRI’s annual reports by name as ‘Animal attendants’, a title which was 
certainly an improvement on the earlier references to ‘mouse boys’, but which 
nevertheless understated their role. 40 Aside from the mundane but exacting 
tasks of feeding the mice and keeping them healthy, these attendants (as the 
photographic evidence makes clear) also performed the skilled operations 
including injecting mice brains. When some of these attendants joined a one-day 
strike of public workers in 1945 (the only mention of Nigerian political activity 
in the Rockefeller archive of the YFRI at a time of considerable political ferment), 
two of the wives of American scientists, Mrs Bugher and Mrs Jones, were drafted 
in to ‘save’ the colony.41  Then as now, scientific research carried out by external 
agencies in Africa depended heavily on the skills and commitment of local 
workers, who were rarely accorded the status of scientists themselves.42 
 
The relentless routine of the mouse colony was absolutely central to the work of 
the Institutes, both at Yaba and its twin establishment in Entebbe. It was exacting 
work. Not only were mice employed in epidemiological work (the “protection 
tests”) but mice titrations were also used to ensure the quality of the vaccine 
which the Institute was responsible for distributing in the region to Allied 
troops, and for the development of a new scratch vaccine.43 What this actually 
meant in terms of laboratory practice can be glimpsed from John Bugher’s report 
for 1948 in which he described the processes in detail: the incubation and 
injection of chicken embryos with viral material, the removal and grinding of 
embryos in a homogeniser, the pipetting into glass containers, before culturing 
and titration. This was a process repeated, but with additional elements, to test 
the ‘combined vaccine’ using sheep lymph. Once produced in the laboratory, 
these vaccines were tested on both animal and humans subjects and their blood 
samples analysed in the Yaba laboratory.44  
 
Page 9 of 35 Bulletin of the History of Medicine
For Peer Review
 10
Yellow fever epidemiology demanded work on all aspects of the disease cycle. In 
addition to the mouse colony, and the laboratory for vaccine development and 
protection tests, Yaba maintained an animal house and mosquito colonies. 
Though the employment of expatriat ‘wives’ was to become a source of friction 
between John Bugher and the local colonial authorities, who were under 
pressure to train more Nigerian staff, Mrs Marjorie Taylor, the wife of a British 
science schoolteacher working in Lagos, was for some time employed as a 
zoologist and took over the supervision of the animal experiments. Primatology, 
as Donna Haraway has argued, is a highly gendered and racialised science.45 By 
the late 1940s, photographs of animals began to feature in the Yaba annual 
reports. In 1947 report a full-front portrait of ‘Lulu’ a captive chimpanzee 
occupied pride of place.46 Lulu was apparently one of Yaba’s favourite residents 
and was frequently photographed in the arms of Mrs Taylor.  
 
In their mosquito studies, the Rockefeller scientists at Yaba combined the use of 
highly sophisticated equipment with the most basic of labour-intensive 
techniques. The photographic archive for yellow fever in Africa, including that 
for Yaba, is littered with pictures of men (both African and white men) in shorts 
sitting and staring intently at the bare skin of their legs. The captions read 
‘Catching mosquitoes’.47 Mosquito catching also took place on a larger scale at 
field sites, as I describe in the next section. Since the discovery that yellow fever 
could be transmitted by mosquito vectors other than a des aegpyti, the study of 
the habits of a range of species, including their habitats, their flying and feeding 
habits and their interactions with human and other animal hosts, was an 
essential part of the African yellow fever research.  The mosquito research took 
place both in the field and in the laboratory. One of John Bugher’s aims was to be 
able to transmit the yellow fever virus from mosquito to mosquito without 
intermediary or use of monkeys. Colonies of mosquitoes were created in the 
laboratory and forcibly fed with suspensions of the virus derived from guinea pig 
blood. To ascertain whether the mosquitoes had successfully infected each other 
mice were injected intracerebrally with titrated mosquito.48  Nigerian assistants 
worked on the mosquito colonies under the supervision of the entomologist .  
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If much of the laboratory work was necessarily mundane, Bugher’s enthusiasm 
for the latest technologies ensured that this was combined with cutting-edge 
methods entailing the importation of expensive equipment. Bugher introduced 
to Yaba two sets of new techniques to aid the study of mosquito vectors. The first 
was the use of radioactive isotopes to mark and track mosquitoes in the field, 
which I discuss in the next section. The second was the use of sound equipment 
in the laboratory. On leave in the United States Bugher had made contact with Dr 
Kahn of Cornell University who had devised a system whereby mosquitoes could 
be observed and their distinctive sounds recorded “without the observer 
intruding his presence”. In 1948 he imported a soundproof chamber, within 
which a mosquito cage was suspended along with a microphone in a cable and 
recording equipment. Climatic conditions within the chamber could be 
manipulated to mimic real environmental circumstances. This was a case of 
bringing the environment into the laboratory and the obverse of the 
‘experimental hut’ described by Ann H Kelly in her work on present-day malaria 
studies in Africa.49 The sound system recorded a range of mosquito sounds, from 
the fluttering of their wings to the mating sounds of male and female, enabling a 
detailed study of behaviour in captivity.  
 
The work of the yellow fever scientists was both myopic and expansive, a point 
also made by Heather Bell in her research on Sudan.50 At times their single-
minded and technocratic pursuit of the hidden ‘secrets’ of the yellow fever virus 
appears extreme and frankly bizarre. But the nature of yellow fever 
epidemiology also constantly drove them beyond the laboratory to a more wide-
ranging appreciation of environment and ecology. 51 The scientists knew that 
field-based research was key to any significant advances they might make. The 
central ‘puzzle’ of yellow fever in Africa centred on its endemic form – so-called 
‘jungle fever’. Both in South America and in the Entebbe institute (established in 
1936), Rockefeller-funded researchers had elaborated techniques to study 
yellow fever transmission in forest areas and amongst rural populations. The 
Entebbe–based scientists (led by Alexander Mahaffy, formerly of the West 
African Commission, and now famous for his role in the identification of the Zika 
virus), responding initially to an outbreak of unknown fever amongst road 
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workers in the Bwamba area, had set up a semi-permanent field station there, 
where they conducted exhaustive entomological, zoological and epidemiological 
research.  Soon after establishing their laboratory and animal facilities, the Yaba 
scientists also began field research and were searching for a field site equivalent 
to that at Bwamba. 
 
 
Blood, mosquitoes and the creation of the ‘field’  
The  ‘field’ for the Yaba scientists was in fact a set of overlapping scientific 
spaces. Firstly there was the ‘field’ of research into the past and current extent of 
yellow fever infection in West Africa. Secondly, there was the ‘field’ of 
experimentation with new vaccines, and thirdly there was the ‘field’ of 
ecosystems. Endemic  ‘jungle yellow fever’ was presumed to exist in West Africa, 
but its existence had yet to be proven. Establishing this would necessitate a 
combination of animal studies including immunity studies similar to those 
carried out on human populations, and susceptibility studies involving the 
trapping of animals and attempting to infect them with yellow fever virus. Insect 
studies in the field would also be essential to understand the range of mosquito 
vectors involved and their relationship to both human and other mammal 
populations. The studies of the behaviour of yellow fever virus in laboratory 
mosquitoes needed to be correlated with field-based evidence for transmission. 
Mosquitoes, it was apparent, behaved differently in captivity.52   
 
Building on the earlier work of the Commission, the scientists set about mapping 
the distribution of yellow fever in West Africa. Though thought to be extensively 
present, the virus was also infuriatingly elusive.  The colonial medical authorities 
had been instructed to report any suspicious outbreak of disease to the Institute, 
but everyone was well aware that reporting alone would never be sufficient. The 
second method, which had been employed effectively (but not 
uncontroversially) by Rockefeller researchers in Central and South America, and 
experimented with in Uganda and the Belgian Congo, was viscerotomy53 . 
Viscerotomy entailed the extraction and testing of liver tissue from ‘fresh’ 
corpses. Bugher regarded it as essential for accumulating knowledge on the 
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current incidence of yellow fever, but there had been earlier attempts to set up a 
viscerotomy service in West Africa, which appear to have failed.54 The obstacle, 
Bugher discovered from talking to British officials and to Alexander Mahaffy who 
had been part of the earlier Commission, was “not native resentment”, but 
“administrative”, that is, finding out about deaths before burials had taken 
place.55 It seems that in Nigeria this theory was put to the test again only briefly 
in 1944. In collaboration with the government, fourteen experimental 
viscerotomy posts were established around the country. The Rockefeller 
scientists reported that local medical officers were “sceptical but cooperative”. 
No reports of major “native resistance” reached the Rockefeller scientists and at 
the end of the experiment they concluded that it was indeed the lack of close 
administrative supervision of deaths that made the use of viscerotomy 
impractical.56  
 
If viscerotomy was impracticable, this was apparently not the case with the 
“protection test” which became the central tool of yellow fever epidemiological 
research and, along with vaccine trials, entailed the creation of experimental 
communities. The creation of such communities and the ethics of bioscientific 
experimentation are central themes in recent literature on global health in 
Africa. These sites have been described as “states of exception” in which the 
scientists (especially those involved in large drug trials) are often very far 
removed from clinical engagements. These characteristics have in turn been 
linked to the privatisation of previously publicly-run services in Africa over the 
last few decades and to the dominance of vertical, disease-specific research.57  
 
The area around Yaba had been an experimental site for the yellow fever 
researchers on and off since the mid-1920s. 58 As soon as the laboratory re-
opened in 1943 they began collecting blood from local schoolchildren and testing 
it for immunity. Samples from children were especially valuable for the 
“protection tests” since through them the scientists could date recent outbreaks 
(or “passages” as they sometimes put it) of the disease. This practice was 
extended to other parts of West Africa, in an attempt to generate a map of yellow 
fever incidence and immunity. As John Bugher explained, particular attention 
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was given to children under the age of 15, as this enabled them to track recent 
possible outbreaks of yellow fever, and also ensured continuity with earlier 
studies of yellow fever in Nigeria.59 Some of the samples were obtained directly 
from schoolchildren at Lagos School Clinic, and others were provided “through 
the kindness” of medical officers in Ilorin and Jos Plateau.  
 
The scientists did not spend much time worrying about the ethics of these 
procedures, though they did sometimes place the word ‘volunteer’ in inverted 
commas in their correspondence. They were privately critical of what they 
regarded as the excessive caution of British colonial officials when it came to 
experimentation on African subjects. In the area of vaccine development they 
regarded themselves as manifestly more responsible that the French, whose 
mass vaccination programme in French West Africa had been criticised as 
unsafe.60 They prided themselves on their safety record. However, as John Farley 
has pointed out, the occurrence in 1942 of jaundice outbreaks amongst Allied 
troops resulting from yellow fever vaccination had come as a “slap in the face” 
for the Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation and produced a degree of 
caution all round.61  There is no evidence from the Yaba archive of any major 
iatrogenic incident, though this cannot be completely ruled out. 62 Unlike the 
sleeping sickness vaccine programme in Cameroon described by Lachenal, the 
Rockefeller scientists in West Africa did not administer a useless vaccine to large 
numbers of people under dangerous conditions, and n ither did they work with 
an explicitly racial theory of disease. 63 Nevertheless, the research relied, 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly, on a degree of coercion which most of us 
would find unacceptable. Undoubtedly some people gave blood willingly, but 
children and leprosy patients had little choice but to cooperate. Others did so on 
the instructions of local chiefly authorities, who in turn took instructions from 
the British colonial authorities. 64  
 
The ‘field’ was also a field of entomology, which once again relied on the 
considerable input of Nigerian labour. In 1945, the British entomologist, P.F. 
Mattingly, who was seconded from the colonial medical service, began a detailed 
study of mosquito species, their habits and distribution at a field station on the 
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Ogun river. Using a technique perfected by his colleagues in Uganda, particularly 
the indefatigable Alexander Haddow 65, Mattingly had erected a series of 
platforms at different heights on which were stationed trained Nigerian 
assistants working in pairs, whose job it was to catch mosquitoes. Over 30,000 
mosquitoes were caught, composed of more than 50 species and their biting 
cycles and vertical distributions studied.66  As these figures indicate, this was a 
remarkably labour-intensive and exacting enterprise. 
 
The labour intensity of mosquito catching was, however, combined at Yaba with 
the most innovative and cutting-edge of techniques. Around the same time as he 
had become aware of Kahn’s ‘mosquito sound’ studies, Bugher also heard of the 
possibility of using radioactive isotopes to mark mosquitoes and track them in 
the field. This technique would allow for more accurate mosquito tracking, 
though it did not do away with the laborious task of catching them.67 In 1947, 
having sought advice whilst on leave in the United States, Bugher, backed by his 
colleagues in New York, set about obtaining permission to import the radioactive 
material from the United States and to have it transported, along with a Geiger 
counter, safely to Nigeria.  He then began a series of experiments in the marking 
of mosquito larvae in the laboratory at Yaba, followed by further experiments 
releasing the mosquitoes in the field.68 
 
 
The Ogbomosho Epidemic : a ‘natural experiment’ 
The Yaba-based researchers were saved by an epidemic, which acted for them as 
a ‘natural experiment’. The absence of active clinical cases amongst Africans had 
been a major impediment to their work. Yellow fever in West Africa, as in 
Uganda, was a kind of ‘present absence’, its ‘passages’ through populations could 
be seen through the protection tests, but actual cases remained elusive. In April 
1946 came the news that a Syrian trader, Mr S Shaar, hospitalised in Lagos, had 
been suffering from yellow fever. An interview with Shaar revealed that he had 
most likely been infected in Ogbomosho (now Ogbomoso), a densely populated 
city of about 100,000 people in southwest Nigeria around thirty miles from the 
railway connecting Ibadan and Ilorin. Ogbomosho was not unknown to the 
Page 15 of 35 Bulletin of the History of Medicine
For Peer Review
 16
earlier generation of Rockefeller scientists conducting work on urban yellow 
fever. Henry Hanson’s diary mentions a visit there in 1927.69  Further research 
was carried out in the town in the early 1930s , and in 1937 there had been two 
European cases of yellow fever reported from there. 70  
 
At Yaba this news was greeted with excitement and Bugher immediately went 
into action preparing a major case-finding and research expedition, equipping a 
mobile laboratory, including a few boxes of mice. The expedition team included 
Bugher himself who would work in the clinical and epidemiological studies with 
Drs Hahn and Macnamara; the entomologist  (Mattingly), the zoologist (Marjorie 
Taylor), and Mr J.E Knight who would supervise the laboratory work. Mrs Knight 
was placed in charge of organising and supervising the practicalities of the 
expedition and its camp. Twenty unnamed African staff also took part in the 
expedition, including Bugher’s cook, two chauffeurs, a carpenter, eight ‘mosquito 
boys’, four ‘animal boys’, four animal trappers, one laboratory assistant, two 
house stewards and one laundryman. 71 Bugher’s plan was to study all aspects of 
yellow fever epidemiology in Ogbomosho, but the primary aim was to identify 
actual cases in Africans and isolate strains of the virus from them.   
 
Ogbomosho was described a “native city”. It had no resident British 
administrator and was run through the native authority system typical of British 
rule – by a chief, who oversaw around one hundred village headmen. The 
majority of the city’s densely packed population were agriculturalists who 
moved constantly between the city and their fields, within a radius of around 
fifteen miles and also engaged very actively in trade (as Mr Shaar’s presence 
there had indicated). Bugher estimated that if you took this mobility into 
account, the population potentially affected by an outbreak of disease in the 
town was very much larger than the estimated population of 100,000 – more like 
a million people. Despite its size, Ogbomosho had no government medical officer, 
but it was home to a leprosy asylum (which still exists) and a Baptist Mission 
Hospital. 72As was immediately apparent to the team, the environmental 
conditions in the city were highly conducive to mosquito-borne diseases. The 
population took its water supply from a small reservoir, greatly depleted owing 
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to a recent drought, and stored it in water pots in the compounds. There was also 
a dyeing industry in the city, and the dye pits acted as breeding grounds for 
mosquitoes. The mosquito implicated in urban yellow fever, aedes aegypti, was 
everywhere. Unsurprisingly, malaria was common. Indeed, before any cases of 
yellow fever were found, it was apparent that a malaria epidemic was in full 
swing.   
 
Earlier yellow fever scientists had often remarked that when the disease 
attacked Africans its effects were often mild and transient and indistinguishable 
from other fevers. The Rockefeller scientists did not subscribe to the view (which 
had long been ass ciated with the Atlantic slavery) that Africans were immune 
to the disease.73 Though they very occasionally speculated on genetic adaptation, 
their methods, particularly the ‘protection test’, were based on the assumption 
that African populations were susceptible to yellow fever infection. The results 
of these ‘protection’ surveys, which showed that in some specific geographical 
areas (and certainly not everywhere), a significant proportion of the population 
could have been infected in the past and survived, appeared to demonstrate that 
mortality rates for Africans were indeed lower than they appeared to be for non-
Africans. But they were cautious in interpreting these results, noting that most 
deaths went unrecorded, and that disease surveillance was extremely 
rudimentary. Indeed, as Jennifer Tappan has argued, the maps of immunity could 
also be read as maps of susceptibility, demonstrating that in some areas rates of 
protection against the disease were very low.74  However, hen compared to the 
widespread effects of malaria, and with high mortality from other infectious 
diseases (including smallpox, cerebrospinal meningitis, and later, polio), the 
immediate threat posed by yellow fever to African populations appeared to some 
British medical officers to be minimal. The Ogbomosho epidemic presented an 
opportunity for the Rockefeller scientists to demonstrate that the threat of urban 
epidemics, such as had been experienced in the coast in earlier decades, was still 
real.  
 
The immediate reaction of the Ogbomosho population and its leadership was 
frankly sceptical. Bugher reported that “Early in the investigation it became 
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apparent that the native inhabitants did not know that there was an epidemic 
among them, nor were they interested”.75 Part of this “lack of interest” might be 
explained by suspicion of the scientists’ motives. Their arrival in a cavalcade with 
their mobile laboratory had entailed large-scale ‘bleedings’ and was followed by 
an increased presence of the colonial authorities who set about instituting 
emergency measures, including DDT spraying, emptying water pots and 
preventing movement in and out of the town. Bugher’s team initially found some 
difficult identifying cases – the epidemic was proceeding unnoticed. Eventually, 
with the cooperation of schoolteachers they worked backwards from pupil 
absentee records, visiting sick schoolchildren (or those who had recovered) in 
their homes and taking blood samples from them and from family members. 
Daily visits were made to suspected yellow fever cases and severely ill people 
were taken to the Baptist Mission Hospital, where autopsies were also 
performed. Eventually, 75 cases were positively identified by blood tests, 
including nine deaths, though Bugher later estimated that the overall mortality 
rate was probably less that 1%. Bugher believed that in all there might have been 
as many as 5,000 cases altogether, but observations seemed to confirm that 
yellow fever was a “milder disease” in Africans, and that in some cases none of 
the classical signs of yellow fever were present. Bugher concluded that yellow 
fever in Africa is “an acute febrile disease distinguished by its high variability and 
high proportion of mild cases….convalescence is typically rapid and complete, 
especially among children.”76  The epidemic had provided a unique research 
opportunity.  Thirty-four strains of the virus had been isolated from patients and 
immunological studies conducted on primates. The virus had also been extracted 
from aedes aegypti mosquitoes and from monkeys hunted in the region. Detailed 
patient case histories had been collected. Liver samples had been taken for 
analysis at Yaba. Over 60,000 people were vaccinated against the disease and in 
subsequent years extensive vaccine trials were carried out in Ogbomosho, 
including on the semi-captive population of leprosy patients in the Ogbomosho 
asylum. 77 
 
Ogbomosho had constituted one kind of experimental setting. The identification 
of the epidemic had allowed Bugher and his colleagues to examine the various 
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aspects of urban yellow fever epidemiology in real time, in contrast to the 
‘protection tests’ which were a constant and tantalising reminder that they had 
missed previous outbreaks. Furthermore, the strains isolated from the 
Ogbomosho patients could be used in the ongoing work of vaccine development.  
With its relatively low mortality rate, Ogbomosho could hardly be called a 
‘classic’ case of an urban yellow fever epidemic as described in the tropical 
diseases textbooks. Nevertheless, its epidemiology appears to have been 
relatively straightforward. The more complex epidemiology of ‘jungle yellow 
fever’ was still incompletely understood. For this, another kind of experimental 
fieldwork space was called for. If it did not exist, it had to be created. 78 
 
Manufacturing a yellow fever outbreak: the Kumba experiment 
From the beginning of his time as Director of the Yellow Fever Research Institute 
at Yaba, John Bugher had been pushing an idea that he knew to be controversial. 
He drew on the lessons of his colleagues in Uganda. Though they appeared to 
have found an ideal location for the study of ‘jungle’ yellow fever in the Bwamba 
forest, the work was long and painstaking and had produced only one human 
case in six years of intensive research. Writing in his diary during a visit to 
Entebbe in 1945, Bugher argued that in order to advance the research a forest 
site should be identified in West Africa into which the yellow fever virus could be 
artificially introduced into the non-human mammal population and its 
subsequent spread monitored. This would allow a ‘shortcut’ to understanding 
the entire cycle of sylvan yellow fever, an experiment that could be completed in 
weeks rather than the years that seemed to be required in natural 
circumstances. There was one obvious possible objection to this plan. The 
scientists would be introducing yellow fever to an area and to a human 
population that had quite possibly never experienced it before and the  
“administration would be horrified at the prospect of turning yellow fever loose 
under any circumstances.”79  Bugher planned, however, to control those 
“circumstances” as far as possible. They would identify an isolated area of low 
population density where human mobility could be easily monitored and they 
would vaccinate the entire population before introducing the virus into the 
forest canopy through caged rhesus monkeys.  In fact, this protective measure 
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also had an experimental dimension as Bugher intended to use the opportunity 
to test a new scratch vaccine grown in chick embryos under field conditions.  
 
After exploring possible sites in Nigeria and elsewhere, eventually a location was 
found for such an experiment in the British Cameroons. The requirements for 
such an experiment were exacting. The area had to be forested and to harbour an 
abundant animal and insect (especially mosquito) population; it should have a 
low human population density and be relatively isolated from travel routes.  
Kumba, in southwestern Cameroon, is a town (now a major trading hub) on the 
edge of a forested extinct volcano. The Rockefeller team selected a site near the 
volcano, with a population of around 4,000 people. Initial ‘protection’ surveys 
indicated that previous exposure to yellow fever was low (around 10%) and 
therefore that a mass vaccination programme, using the new 17D scratch 
vaccine, would have to take place in advance of the experiment. Against possible 
objections that the team was introducing yellow fever into an area that had 
previously had little or no experience of it, Bugher could argue that since there 
was proof, from an earlier survey, of yellow fever infection in “the general area” 
amongst the monkey population, “nothing new was being introduced which was 
not already in the region”.80  
 
In December 1947 preparations for the field study began. A van, jeep and Dr 
Bugher’s car were shipped to Victoria (the port of British Cameroon) in advance 
of the arrival of the staff (which included Nigerian personnel) by air and road. 
The equipment list was extensive, including material for taking blood samples 
and for separating sera; sealed ampoules for the latter; materials for the 
preparation of skins and skulls; entomological collecting supplies; microscopes 
and slides, stains, a portable dry heat steriliser, a small autoclave, hand 
centrifuges and pressure filters for the monkey sera, plus tents and supplies. In 
June, having settled on a site within the Kumba crater, the team began by 
vaccinating the entire population within a five mile radius after pre-inoculation 
samples had been taken from a sub-group of 200 people. A laboratory was set up 
in a shed at the local hospital, an electric plant installed to run the refrigerator. 
The five rhesus monkeys and 600 mice arrived by sea and were trucked up to the 
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site. One of the monkeys was inoculated with a Nigerian strain of yellow fever 
(but not without some difficulty) and placed on a platform hoisted into the forest 
canopy. The monkey was bled daily to ensure that it was still infected with the 
virus. After a couple of weeks, the next stage of the experiment began. 
Mosquitoes were to be collected in the area, ground down and inoculated into 
mice. Subsequently, a sample of local monkeys would be shot to ascertain 
whether any of them had been infected. 
 
The fieldwork did not go smoothly. The first inoculated rhesus monkey placed in 
the forest canopy failed to fall sick and had to be replaced by a second one which 
appeared to have been highly infectious before dying. But as the entomological 
work began, a significant and unanticipated problem arose – the scarcity of 
mosquitoes. Bugher and his colleagues concluded that they needed many more 
mosquito catchers under these circumstances and made an arrangement with 
the local Catholic Mission School for fifty volunteer schoolboys (all vaccinated) to 
help with the night catches. Even with this apparently enthusiastic assistance 
only nine specimens of A. Africanus (the mosquito thought to be implicated in 
transmission in this area) were recovered from a total of 701 man-hours of 
catching.  These were ground down and inoculated into mice, but no trace of 
yellow fever virus was found. Animal trapping was continued and twenty 
monkeys were shot around the lake, but ultimately it became clear that the 
experiment had failed to infect the animal population. Bugher concluded that this 
was due to the peculiarity of the mosquito population in the Kumba area. More 
positively, the programme of vaccination using the new vaccine had yielded an 
immunisation rate of 92.3%, with no adverse clinical reactions. 81 
 
It was deeply ironic that, in a region plagued by mosquito-borne disease, in this 
experimental setting the mosquitoes refused to cooperate. In a later publication, 
Bugher used the failed Cameroonian field experiment to reflect on the 
complexity of ‘jungle’ yellow fever epidemiology and on scientific methods.82  In 
his correspondence with the Foundation he remarked that “A lot of hard work 
went into that experiment – one thing we learned was that so-called 
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bacteriological warfare is not so easy.”83 He would have reason to reconsider 
these words. 
 
African Virus Research and the Cold War 
In 1949 the Rockefeller Foundation withdrew its scientists from the Yellow 
Fever Virus Research Institute at Yaba and handed the facility over to the British 
colonial authorities. In theory, the Institute had always been a joint enterprise, 
but the Americans had long complained that the British contribution was 
inadequate, and that British bureaucracy was cumbersome. The colonial 
authorities in Nigeria seemed, to the Americans, to be paralysed by anxieties 
associated with decolonisation. Bugher complained that it was no longer 
possible to recruit British women (including wives of local colonial officials) to 
certain roles without first demonstrating that there were no Nigerians suitable 
for these posts.84 More generally, the Rockefeller Foundation appeared to have 
concluded that that their ambitious field research programme on yellow fever in 
Africa and South America at Yaba had run its course.85 The Yaba scientists could 
certainly claim that their vaccine research had made a major contribution to the 
development of a safe and effective vaccine. The extensive ‘protection’ test 
surveys appeared to confirm that yellow fever was active as a human disease in 
parts of West Africa, and that there was more than one variant of ‘jungle’ yellow 
fever in Africa. Ogbomosho had also demonstrated that urban yellow fever was 
still a threat, Indeed, in his rather belated plea to the Americans to stay at Yaba, 
the British Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones cited the Ogbomosho 
epidemic.86 However, the relatively low mortality rate made it hard to argue that 
yellow fever was a priority in terms of African health.87  The extensive and 
expensive research on ‘jungle’ yellow fever seemed to have resulted in the 
conclusion that this variety of yellow fever was much less common in West 
Africa than it was in South America, and, though there was always a danger of 
yellow fever spreading from forest reservoirs to human populations, that had 
been mitigated by the development of the vaccine.  As the Annual report of the 
International Health Division of the Foundation put it in 1950, “… it is not a dead 
foe; it is only a dormant one. The price of freedom from yellow fever is constant 
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vigilance.” 88 The fact that the British colonial authorities never implemented a 
widespread vaccination programme was, of course, a major weakness. 
 
The failure of the Kumba experiment was a disappointment to Bugher. Virus 
research, however, was still a hot topic, and the knowledge gained from the 
extensive African research was important to the wider field. In 1949 Bugher 
wound down the laboratory at Yaba, handing its facilities over to the colonial 
authorities and moved to a position in the International Health Division 
laboratories at the Rockefeller Institute in New York where he would continue to 
investigate ‘new viruses’.89 He took 200 mice with him.  However this was far 
from being a final ending of Rockefeller involvement in yellow fever research in 
West Africa, as Thomas P. Monath has shown.90 
 
In Bugher’s papers an undated document, authored by him and entitled ‘A 
Wartime Scientific Programme for the International Health Division’ refers to the 
circumstances of the “resurgence” of “open warfare”, presumably alluding to the 
outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and the new role this implied for the 
IHD.91 The threat of biological warfare utilising viruses amongst other agents had 
been raised in the Second World War when the Japanese used toxins in the their 
Chinese campaigns. A US biological warfare programme began in 1941 and 
expanded after the war.92 Bugher advocated a programme that would be both of 
“immediate military value in either defense or offense”, and of “lasting value to 
science”. Specifically, he suggested that the programme concentrate on research 
into virus and rickettsial diseases (including yellow fever), and an evaluation of 
the potential of a range of viruses for “effective employment” in biological 
warfare. The potential relevance of the Foundation’s earlier Africa-based 
research was clear in this document, including the reference to the importance of 
establishing the natural vectors of significant viruses and the use of radioactive 
tagging.93  
 
By 1950, Bugher’s expertise in the use of isotopes (and possibly his viral 
research) also came to the attention of Shields Warren, the Director of the 
Division of Biology and Medicine at the US Atomic Energy Commission. In 
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December 1950, Shields Warren wrote to the Director of the IHD, George Strode, 
to say that the Atomic Energy Commission required Bugher’s expertise and 
asked if Bugher could be released from IHD employment for at least two years to 
work as Deputy Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine. Strode initially 
resisted, arguing (somewhat disingenuously) that it did not appear to him that 
Bugher had expertise appropriate for this role, and that his virus research made 
him virtually irreplaceable to the IHD.94  Presumably Bugher was keen to assume 
this new position. Strode relented and in March 1951 Bugher  moved to be 
Deputy Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine at the AEC, becoming its 
Director in 1952.  
 
This was a period in the United States of heightened anxiety about biological 
warfare and even before taking over the role at Atomic Energy Commission, 
Bugher had addressed Civilian Protection Groups on ‘General Considerations on 
the use of Infectious agents as Weapons’.95 Bugher argued that the objective of 
using such a weapon would not necessarily be that of “wholesale destruction” 
and “mass slaughter”, since this might result in the victor being left with the 
burden of a “paralysed” enemy. The real potential of biological weapons lay in 
their ability to “incapacitate the enemy temporarily” and to “induce the enemy to 
expend essential energy and war potential in useless activity.”   
 
As Bugher had discovered in the Cameroons, yellow fever was not the easiest 
disease to weaponise. In a 2005 Roundtable, yellow fever expert Thomas Monath 
claimed that “we did weaponise yellow fever in the United States”, but that the 
programme had not gone far.96  In the AEC Bugher worked on testing fission and 
thermonuclear devices and became an expert on the biological consequences of 
fallout. He ended his career as Director of the Nuclear Center of the University of 
Puerto Rico, from 1960-1969.97   
 
 
Yellow Fever Resurgent 
While researchers in Africa in the 1930s and 1940s were frequently exasperated 
by a lack of clinical cases to study, the following decades saw major epidemics in 
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both East and West Africa, including Nigeria. In 1950-1952 there were a 
reported 12,000 cases in Onitsha Province and another epidemic on Jos Plateau 
caused 500-600 deaths. By the mid 1950s, scientists from the Yaba institute, now 
run by the British colonial authorities, had built up a more complex picture of the 
pattern of endemicity and susceptibility to epidemics in different parts of 
Nigeria, and the different vectors involved. In the rain forest belt of South and 
Southwest Nigeria, where villages were interspersed with forest, they found that 
the disease was endemic in both human and monkey populations, and that over 
70% of the population had become immune by the age of ten years. However, 
epidemics did occur in towns (including Ogbomosho) which were in the 
‘transitional belt’ between forest and savannah. In densely populated Eastern 
Nigeria, where most of the forest had disappeared, human populations were 
largely non-immune and epidemics occurred, though the mortality rates 
experienced during these events varied markedly. In Northern Nigeria, were the 
disease was neither endemic nor epizootic, epidemics occurred rarely and could 
usually be traced to an infected traveller entering the region from the south.98 
 
The 1960s saw further major outbreaks in Africa, including a devastating 
epidemic in Ethiopia with an estimated 30,000 deaths. In 1969 there was a 
region-wide epidemic across West Africa. The ending of the mass compulsory 
vaccination scheme in the former French colonies of West Africa made large 
populations vulnerable and resulted in a resurgence of epidemic disease in these 
regions. During an attempt to control one such epidemic in Senegal in 1965, a 
major iatrogenic outbreak of post-vaccinal encephalitis occurred.99 
 
Despite its formal withdrawal from Yaba, the Rockefeller Foundation remained 
heavily involved in research in Africa into yellow fever and related viruses, 
amongst which are West Nile Fever and Zika, both of which have demonstrated a 
capacity to travel and transform in new environments. Climate change raises the 
possibility of further global spread. As in the 1940s, the major impetus for 
African arbovirus research comes more from global biosecurity concerns than it 
does from a desire to protect the health of African populations. However, yellow 
fever itself is now regarded as a major ‘resurgent’ epidemic disease in Africa, 
Page 25 of 35 Bulletin of the History of Medicine
For Peer Review
 26
where around 90% of reported cases occur. 100  Belatedly, immunization, which 
has been so widely used (and enforced) to prevent the global spread of yellow 
fever, is now being applied to African populations. Since 2000 there has been a 
major effort on behalf of international health organisations and African 
governments to extend yellow fever vaccination across the continent and 
between 2006 and 2012, 69 million people received the vaccination.101  
 
If Bugher and his Rockefeller colleagues had made a minimal impact on the 
public health of either West or Eastern Africa, they could claim some role in 
creating a lasting postcolonial research interest in virology in these regions. In 
Nigeria the Rockefeller Foundation contributed to the establishment of the Virus 
Research Laboratory at Ibadan in 1963, now part of the University of Ibadan, and 
in Uganda the Uganda Virus Research Institute succeeded the East African Virus 
Institute, itself a successor of the Rockefeller’s Entebbe Yellow Fever Research 
Institute.  Tragically, the emergence of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa as a 
devastating disease and the recent global spread of Zika virus have both 
highlighted the importance of virus research in African locations and have 
contributed to the continuing international interest in viruses of African origin. 
The legacy of the work of Bugher and his colleagues in terms of research and 
medical priorities is not easily summarised. On the one hand, their technocratic 
enthusiasm and ambitions as international researchers led to them to produce 
the kinds of research enclaves that we see on the continent today – financed by 
international agencies, self-contained and with minimal impact on the health of 
surrounding populations. On the other hand, their multi-faceted research into 
yellow fever had clearly demonstrated the complexity of viral disease and the 
necessity to understand all of its human, animal and environmental aspects. 
Perhaps this contributed to a scepticism on the question of eradication which, as 
Nancy Stepan has argued, was typical of approaches to malaria control in Africa 
even at the height of enthusiasm elsewhere for DDT.102 Without a better financed 
and run public health service and economic and social development, research 
was unlikely to be translated into effective practice, as Bugher and his colleagues 
well knew when the advocated for wider vaccine coverage. The virus itself was 
an unlikely candidate for eradication. 
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